Why Did Custer Lose the Battle of the Little Bighorn?

That’s a question that has been asked time and again and argued over till the truth has been almost lost. There are two camps, one for Custer and one against and I feel that this polarisation has lead to the truth becoming a casualty of war, the war about Custer and who he was.

George Armstong Custer’s character is hard to define without becoming very partisan. Some take the view that he was one of the best cavalry leaders of his time and quote his Civil War record and his operations against the Indians. Most of them will allow that he made some mistakes and also was not blameless as a human being. The other side seems to demonise Custer in every way. History tells us that he was last in his class at West Point, altogether reckless in warfare, cruel and uncaring about the men under his command, politically ambitious but politically naïve. It is also claimed that Custer was so wrapped up in himself that he would use anybody in any way to further his own ambitions. I don’t think either view of him tells the full story, so let’s take a look at some of the facts, as we know them after 140 years of reflection.

Custer was born the son of a blacksmith and was very wanted and loved as a child. As a young man he soon became aware that if he wanted to rise in the world being the son of a working class father was not in his favour. One of the few ways of rising in the American social world of the 1850/60’s was to become an officer and a gentleman, and to win the hand of the girl he ⁽¹⁾loved this was imperative. Custer, with the help of some political friends managed to get a place at West Point in 1857 passing out in 1861. Custer’s time at West Point has been very well documented, and yes, he did accrue the most demerits ever at West Point, and he did pass out bottom of his class. However, he had the sense and determination to pass out and become an officer in the American Military and so made the move into the ranks of gentlemen. No one can take that away from his record.

So what about his Civil War career? Being in the right place at the right time, always willing to put himself in danger without a second thought was a way of getting noticed, and he did! Whilst working as a staff officer for Major General George B. McClellan, then commander of the Army of the Potomac, Custer was promoted to the rank of temporary captain. When McClellan was relieved of command in November 1862 Custer reverted to his rank of first lieutenant. He then fell under the gaze of Major General Alfred Pleasonton then in command of a Cavalry Division. After the battle of Chancellorsville Pleasonton was given command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac in 1863. Pleasanton recognised Custer’s leadership qualities and three days before the battle of Gettysburg Pleasonton promoted Custer from Captain to Major General giving him command of the Michigan Brigade of Cavalry. Custer was one of the youngest Major Generals in the Union Army and was depicted in the press as ⁽²⁾“The Boy General”. By the end of the war Custer had gone on to win many honours and ended up as a household name. He was present at General Robert E. Lee’s signing of the surrender document in the Appomattox Court House in 1865. Custer, being Custer, rode away from the Court House after the surrender with the table on which the surrender document had been signed balanced on his head. General Sheridan had presented Custer with the table as a souvenir of the signing, and as a gift for his wife. The table is now in the Smithsonian Institution but sadly there is no record of what Elizabeth Custer said on receiving the gift!

So what about Custer after the war? In 1866 Custer was mustered out of the volunteer army and reverted to the regular army with the rank of Captain in the 5th Cavalry. On September 21st 1866 Custer took command of the newly formed 7th Cavalry at Fort Riley, Kansas, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. However, due to the intervention of General Sheridan he obtained a brevet appointment as a Major General. A brevet authorised a commissioned officer to hold a higher rank with pay but only for the duration of the assignment.

It is from this point that I think we start to see why things went so wrong for Custer at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. In 1867 the American Government decided to bring the Southern Cheyenne under control by a show of force. They gave command to a Civil War hero, Winfield Scott Hancock with a mixed force of 1400 men including infantry, artillery and Custer’s 7th Cavalry. Hancock’s brief was first to try to talk the Cheyenne onto a reservation but if that failed to force them to comply. The whole campaign turned into a total disaster because of Hancock’s misunderstanding of the Indians’ determination not to accept the white man’s rule.

It was about this time that it began to dawn on Custer how difficult it was to track and fight Indians. Conventional forces moved far too slowly and needed a very cumbersome logistic train to back them up. Indians could, and did travel a lot faster than white troops even with their families in tow. Indians had a great advantage over American troops because their ponies could survive on grass and did not need oats like the cavalry horses. Thus they were able to travel much faster than the troopers. The other problem was finding Indians in the first place. Indians could see the troops coming long before the troops had any idea they were getting close to a village so the Indians could move away very quickly. An entire ⁽³⁾Indian village could move lock stock and barrel in about half an hour and then move faster than the troops trying to catch them. The Indians also had the advantage of knowing the country intimately.

At the end of the summer long campaign Custer was desperate to see his wife. He deserted his command and for this action was court-martialled at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for being AWOL. He was suspended for one year without pay missing the 1868 summer campaign. The 1868 campaign, commanded this time by Gen. Phil Sheridan, was as dismal as Hancock’s 1867 effort had been. However it decided Sheridan that it was virtually impossible to catch Indians in the summer. Sheridan now advocated total war against the Cheyenne who like most other tribes went into more permanent camps in the winter. Sheridan wanted a winter campaign: he also wanted Custer whom he admired. So at his request, Custer was allowed to return to duty with the 7th before his term of suspension had expired.

The Battle of the Washita

Under Sheridan’s command Custer established Camp Supply in Indian Territory (now Oklahoma) in November 1868 as a base for the coming winter campaign. On November 26th Custer stumbled across the Indian village of ⁽⁴⁾Black Kettle near the Washita River. He attacked the camp at first light on the 27th, dividing his command into four units, sending one unit around the back of the village so that when he attacked the village head-on, the Indians would be driven into the troops on the other ⁽⁵⁾side. The other two detachments’ jobs were to stampede the Indian ponies: an Indian afoot was easier to kill than one on horseback. As it was mid-winter the women, children and old folks had to try to get away in thick snow thereby impeding the warrior’s job of trying to defend them.

This was the standard way of attacking an Indian encampment and on this occasion the attack was entirely successful as the village was quite small. However this approach would turn into a disaster at the Little Big Horn eight years later.

This was the first real success against the Cheyenne in two years. As most of the Southern Cheyenne reluctantly moved onto reservations after the battle, Custer’s action was seen as an even bigger success. It was this one fight that built the image of Custer as being the best Indian fighter in the army at that time.

Historic Context for the Battle of the Little Big Horn

In 1874 Custer led a large expedition into the Black Hills where gold was discovered at French Creek near what is now the town of Custer in South Dakota. Prospectors by the hundreds rushed into the Black Hills after the press deliberately leaked the story about the discovery. At the bidding of the civil authorities the army tried to keep the prospectors out but with very little enthusiasm and even less success. As the American Government, at the Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1868, had promised the Sioux that the Black Hills was to be their country in perpetuity the Indians were not best pleased. This action was to lead to war between the Sioux Nation and their allies and the government of the United States.

Two years after the discovery of gold in the Black Hills the situation regarding the Indians was becoming impossible. Most of the Indians were not willing to go onto reservations and concede the Black Hills to the white man. They saw the Black Hills as their last refuge. Also, to the Sioux, this was a sacred place. Government patience ran out in 1875 and the Indians were finally given an ultimatum to be on the reservations by January 31st 1876 or be considered ‘hostiles’. When the Sioux declined this kind offer the military were ordered to enforce government policy. War was inevitable.

The Build Up to The Battle

It was assumed by the army that the Lakota and their Cheyenne ⁽⁶⁾allies would gather somewhere in the Powder and Rosebud rivers area. The Indian agent told the military that they could expect to find something in the region of 800 hostiles. However, 800 hostiles would constitute only 200 to 260 warriors, the remainder being women, children and old people. This proved to be a massive underestimation of the actual warrior numbers.

The first mistake the military made in planning the campaign was to accept the number of hostiles given to them by the Indian agents. This number was maybe correct at the time the military expeditions were being planned. However, it did not take into account the reservation Indians that left for the summer buffalo hunt and would join “the uncooperative non-reservation cousins led by Sitting Bull”. In fact the number of warriors participating in the battle was more like 1,500 to 2,500. Some estimates are as high as 3,500 to 4,000. However, you can take your pick, as any estimate could be right. Even after all this time no one really knows just how many Indians were there on that fateful day in June 1876. All we do know is – there were a lot!

The area to be covered by the military was massive and the main problem with fighting Indians always was “How do you find them?”. The decision was to mount a three-pronged campaign from the East, West and South. The Southern column under the command of Brigadier General George Crook left Fort Fetterman, Wyoming Territory, on May 29th and moved north to the Powder River area. Colonel John Gibbon’s column left Fort Ellis in Western Montana on the 20th March to move east and patrol the Yellow River area. Moving out from Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory, the third column started west on May 17th under the command of Brigadier General Alfred Terry. This was the column that included the 7th Cavalry commanded by Custer who at the time held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The three columns between them had 2,400 soldiers and when you add in the teamsters, Indian allies and white scouts the grand total would not have been very short of 3000 men. To take on the supposed 200 to 260 warriors, this was quite a force.

The Battle of Rosebud Creek

The plan, like most complex military plans, soon started to unravel. On the 17th June a very heavy force of Sioux and Cheyenne attacked Crook’s command which was coming up the South Fork of ⁽⁷⁾Rosebud Creek. The battle was tactically inconclusive but what surprised Crook was how many Indians were involved and with how much tenacity they ⁽⁸⁾fought. Being low on ammunition and rather shaken by the day’s events Crook withdrew his force to Big Goose Creek near present day Sheridan, Wyoming ⁽⁹⁾to await reinforcements. This took Crook out of the equation with drastic results for Custer and the 7th Cavalry.

The Battle of the Little Big Horn

Terry and Gibbon’s columns joined together at the mouth of the Rosebud River in early June. On the 22nd the 7th Cavalry with Custer in command was detached to make a reconnaissance down the Rosebud. The rest of the Terry/Gibbon troops were to follow the Bighorn and Little Big Horn Rivers to where it was expected the Sioux and Cheyenne would be camped.

Let us put to bed right here one misconception about the 7th. It was not a ‘crack’ regiment at all. Firstly, it was a far from happy regiment with a lot of ill feeling amongst the officers about the nepotism shown by Custer. Within the 31 officers in the regiment Custer had under his command two brothers, Boston and Thomas, a brother-in-law, James Calhoun, plus a nephew, Henry Reed. Custer was at odds with Major Reno and Captain Benteen, and there was not much love lost between Custer and the rest of the officers and ⁽¹⁰⁾troopers. Custer was a hard taskmaster.

Also, the training of the troopers was poor, as was the case for most troopers on the frontier at this stage in American history. Custer’s men were issued with Springfield 1873 model single shot carbines of old design. The men had very little target practice, only 20 rounds per year, because of the cost of ammunition. All troopers were issued with a colt single action army revolver firing 6 shots, but sabres had been left behind on Custer’s ⁽¹¹⁾orders.

Custer felt that he was getting close to the Indian encampment on the 24th June when his scouts, both white and Indian, brought reports of a large village camped along the banks of the Little Big Horn River. At this time Custer’s main concern was not to ‘spook’ the Indians before he could get into a position to attack.

Custer was informed by both sets of scouts that this was a very big ‘village’ and in fact Mitch Bouyer, one of the most reliable white scouts, went so far as to tell him. “General, I have been with these Indians for 30 years, and this is the largest village I have ever seen.” Custer was also told the same thing by his Indian scout. However, the fact was that none of the scouts had actually seen the village. What they had seen was the pony herd and smoke from cooking fires. Scouts, both red and white, had a pretty good idea of the size of a village by the amount of smoke and the size of the pony herd.

So Why Did Custer Choose To Ignore the Warnings?

Size, as with many things, is in the eye of the beholder. I think that Custer was probably aware that it was a quite a big village but he could not have imagined how big. There had never been such a large gathering of wild Indians before, and there was never to be a gathering of this size again.

Custer had a full regiment of Cavalry numbering 597 officers and men plus teamsters and scouts which would have brought the total to around 650 men under his direct command. I’m sure he thought he had more than enough troops to handle any number of hostiles he might find in the area. The other matter that would have coloured his judgment was the prevailing attitude in military and civilian circles at that time, that one white man was worth ten Indians in what could be described as a ‘large engagement’. Most people understood that in a one-to-one situation the warrior would have the advantage. However, when it came to a general engagement troops would always prevail because of their superior weapons and command structure.

The 7th made camp on the evening of the 24th about 15 miles from the Little Big Horn. Custer was a little on edge as he was afraid that the Indians might discover his column and up sticks and leave in a hurry. However, as the Indians were there in such large numbers they thought the army would not dare attack them so had no intentions of running. This thought was also bolstered by the result of the Rosebud fight in which they assumed they had seen off the ‘white eyes’.

That night the officers gathered in Custer’s tent and serenaded him, which now seems a strange thing to do. However in those days you made your own entertainment and singing together was something quite common when out on campaign. They sang many songs, one of which was ‘Home Sweet Home’ which was ‘Top of the Pops’ around that time. Upon reflection it was quite poignant as home, sweet or otherwise, for many of them would never be seen again. Custer and the 7th arrived in the vicinity of the Indian camp on the Little Big Horn River around midday on the 25th June 1876.

Custer divided his command into ⁽¹²⁾four units: Captain Benteen moved southwest to cover any attempted escape of the hostiles in that direction; Major Reno was ordered to move north, crossing the Little Big Horn to attack the southern end of the village; the pack train, which moved slower, was to continue north until further orders were received; Custer took his own part of the command north, hidden by bluffs from the eyes of the Indians, to attack the north end of the village and drive them back into Reno’s troopers. This was the classic ‘hammer and anvil’ approach to attacking an Indian village. I feel sure that at this time Custer’s biggest concern was that the Indians would scatter and I don’t think the thought ever entered his head that they would stand and fight.

Reno started his attack around 3pm splashing across a small creek flowing into the ⁽¹³⁾Little Big Horn River. Reno dismounted his men to form a skirmish line to hold the Indians in place while Custer attacked them from the north end of the village. However, he very soon realised that overwhelming numbers of warriors were attacking his command. Custer’s favourite Indian scout, Bloody Knife who was riding with Reno, was shot through the head whilst talking with him about tactics. Reno was splattered in the face with blood and brains causing him to become totally unhinged. He ordered a precipitous retreat across the ⁽¹⁴⁾creek and up the hill on the other side. Soon after Reno reached the top of the hill Benteen’s command and the pack train came up to reinforce the rattled troopers.

The Indian pressure on Reno’s force began to slacken as many of the warriors made for the north end of the village to oppose the attack being mounted by Custer. It was around this time that Benteen took command from a still rattled Reno to try to bring some order to the panicked troopers. Benteen, by his example, was able to get the men to form a defensive perimeter, which was to save many a trooper’s life.

Riding north, screened by the bluffs, Custer was not certain where the top of the village was, so he detached one troop to ride over the bluffs to see if they could see anything. However, as the village was over a mile in length they hit it just above the middle and most of them were killed attempting to rejoin Custer. The Indians, led by ⁽¹⁵⁾Crazy Horse and Gall, two of the most prominent and enterprising war leaders, managed to get a very large body of warriors to ride north of the village and then turn south thereby giving them the high ground from which to attack Custer’s command.

The end of the battle came very quickly with the Indians charging down through the floundering troopers on what is now called ‘Last Stand Hill’. The fight at this stage lasted no more than 20 to 25 minutes and was, as were most Indian and soldier encounters, bloody, savage and brief. All ⁽¹⁶⁾207officers and men under Custer’s command were killed in what has gone down in history as ‘Custer’s Last Stand’.